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ONGHOKHAM*
I Introduction
There are not many writings on Indonesian
business. Even the writings on Indonesian
Chinese have been mostly on their politics,
despite the often-stated importance of their
role in the economy. Indonesia today con-
siders economic development as its main aim,
and has been relying more and more on the
private initiative of its citizens in achieving
this aim. It is in this context that it might be
useful to draw attention to the rise of Oei
Tiong Ham Concern in the prewar period.
Engaged in international trading, sugar mill-
ing, banking, shipping, and some other trade-
related activities, it was the first modem
business conglomerate in Southeast Asia.
The founder of the Concern, Oei Tiong Ham,
was an exception among the Chinese who ran
small businesses relying on family members.
Oei Tiong Ham was not what L. Williams
calls a mere business manager [Williams
1952], or even a simple bearer of risk, but a
leader in economic development as well as a
modernizer of business in the region. His
achievements contradicted the prewar colo-
nial order and J.H. Boeke's dualistic theory
[Boeke 1931]. Ironically, it was the passing
of that order which caused the decline of Oei
Tiong Ham Concern.
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In Indonesia, a legend often grows around a
man of great success, and this is certainly true
in the case of Oei Tiong Ham. Therefore one
should not always accept everything that has
been written about him at its face value. For
example, his daughter Oei Hui Lan's descrip-
tion of her father's elaborate morning toilet
and gargantuan breakfast reminds us more of
a mandarin than a businessman [Koo 1943:
34-35], for the typical picture of a Java-Chinese
businessman is that he did everything fast,
though in his days life was indeed much
slower than today. Oei Tiong Ham's father,
Oei Tjie Sien, might also have had some share
in this legend-making. A typical new im-
migrant from China was poor and illiterate,
but Oei Tjie Sien, who was the first of the fam-
ily to come to Java, might have been an excep-
tion. However, Oei Hui Lan's story of the
aura of light around him during sleep [Koo
1943: 6] was probably not true, for it was
probably borrowed from Javanese society in
which such a story has old and deep roots
[Koo 1943: 7]. Even today Oei Tiong Ham
is still talked about in Indonesia. He is said to
have been a persuasive and sweet-talking
diplomat, somewhat of a financial raider, and
a charmer of women. Unfortunately, there is
no way of knowing today how much of it is a
myth and how much of it was reality.
Oei Tiong Ham's life and career can be
understood better if we know the social and
economic environment of his period. But
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since we cannot discuss every aspect of it, we
would like to narrow our discussion to what
had direct bearings on his life and career,
namely: the formation of the Chinese,
especially peranakan society in Java; the rise
of capital in this society; and Dutch colonial
policy which shaped these developments.
And then we want to focus our attention on
Semarang, where Oei Tiong Ham grew up,
and view his business expansion against the
business and social background of the city.
II Peranakan Society under Dutch
Colonial Policy
Although the Chinese began coming to
Southeast Asia a long time ago (probably as
far back as the dawn of history), the structure
of the Chinese community in Indonesia today
started to develop only after the advent of
Dutch colonialism in the region. In 1619, the
VOC (Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie,
or Dutch East India Company) made Batavia
its headquarters for its trading operations in
Asia, and Java, where Batavia was located,
became the cradle of Dutch colonialism in the
Indonesian archipelago [Masselman 1963].
Colonization of the Philippines, however,
started earlier than that of Java, but compared
with the Dutch, the Spaniards who colonized
the Philippines were less commercially
oriented and less efficient in exploiting their
colony. Because of this, they had less need
for Chinese labor. At the end of the Spanish
period, there were about 40,000 Chinese there
[Purcell 1980: 496], but around the same
time, there were 300,000 Chinese in Java
[Purcell 1980: 386]. Like the Dutch, they
came to the Indonesian archipelago to earn
money. The Dutch founder of Batavia, J.P.
Coen, who was Governor General of the col-
ony from 1919 to 1923, thought of the Chinese
in the city as an essential economic asset.
The Chinese formed a majority in Batavia's
population, living as artisans, traders, contrac-
tors, and coolies. And in the 18th century,
they began operating sugar mills in the en-
virons of the city. They were its middle class
as well as its proletariat. The traders were
intermediaries between the Dutch and the
indigenous people as well as between city and
hinterland [Blusse 1986: 78-79].
In early colonial days, the Dutch tried to
populate Batavia with free burghers, by en-
couraging immigration from their country.
But this failed because the VOC did not really
want to develop a city of free burghers from
the fear that such a city would threaten its
trade monopoly and its authoritarian political
structure [Taylor 1983]. Ultimately, the
VOC preferred forming an economic partner-
ship with the Chinese, and this became a
permanent aspect of the Dutch colonial order.
Early Batavia was already what J .5. Fur-
nivall later called a pluralistic society [Fur-
nivall 1939]. Each group tended to have an
independent social life and was administered
by its own headman. In Jakarta today, the
pattern of residence developed in early
Batavia is still reflected in such locational
names as Kampung Cina, Kampung Bali,
Kampung Melayu, and Kampung Arab. Un-
til 1740, however, the Chinese seemed to have
been able to live anywhere in the town. They
were, however, managed by their own
headmen-the so called officers, such as
kapitan, lieutenant and quartermaster. The
officers were appointed by the Dutch and usu-
157
ally selected on the basis of wealth-the source
of respect and influence in merchant com-
munities· like that of the Chinese. Later,
when the local Chinese developed a sense of
solidarity among themselves as peranakan
and established themselves as a group
different from the newly arrived Chinese
(singkeh/totok) , Chinese officers were ap-
pointed only from them.
The existence of the Chinese officer system
did not mean that the VOC did not intervene
in Chinese community affairs. In 1655, the
Dutch established the Council of
Boedelmeesters (Trustees), consisting of both
Dutchmen and Chinese, to administer the in-
heritance of the Chinese who died without
issue or without children who had come of
age. The fund the trustees came to ad-
minister was used to build hospitals and or-
phanages. The Dutch and the Chinese also
had to jointly deal with some other problems
such as sanitation and debtor-creditor rela-
tions involving both. And also, from early
days, the Chinese could take advantage of the
Dutch commercial law which gave protection
to their property. Being the headquarters of
the VOC, Batavia enjoyed the best legal pro-
tection, so many Chinese preferred to stay
there [Blusse 1986: 85].
From the founding of Batavia in 1619 to the
end of the VOC in 1800, the relations between
the Dutch and the Chinese seemed generally
good, but in 1740 there occurred a massacre
of Chinese in Batavia. This was followed by
the so-called Olanda-Cina (Hollanders-
Chinese) war, which in tum led to a war of suc-
cession among the Javanese princes, dividing
them into the pro-Chinese and pro-Dutch
groups. Peaceful relations between the
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Dutch and the Chinese seemed to have been
restored within one or two years, even sooner
in Batavia, but one permanent effect of the
1740 massacre was that the Chinese were
from then on assigned to their own residential
quarters, called Chinese kamp [de Haan
1935: 376-395], and were forbidden to live
elsewhere. The quarters were called Chinese
ghettos, or Chinatown, and this residential pat-
tern led to a zoning system. In Dutch it was
called wijkenstelsel, which together with the
passenstelsel, which required a pass for the
Chinese planning to travel outside, restricted
their freedom of movement. However, it was
not until 1830 that these restrictions were
rigorously enforced by Dutch officials [Rush
1977: 95-96].
Even before 1740, the Dutch tended to keep
the various ethnic groups they ruled separate
from each other. In the beginning, this
tendency was derived more from religious con-
siderations than from racial ones. This is not
too difficult to understand if we remember the
fact that the Dutch came from the Europe of
the 17th century, when religious intolerance
was at its zenith. The term "peranakan," for
example, reflected the Dutch religious bias.
Until the early 19th century, the term was
used to refer to the Chinese who became
Moslems, or the shaven Chinese-the Chinese
who shaved off their pigtails when they
became Moslems. Their number seems to
have been quite large. The VOC segregated
them from the non-Moslem Chinese and ap-
pointed their own officers. The position of
major in the Moslem Chinese community in
Batavia was, however, abolished in 1827
when they became indistinguishable from the
indigenous Moslem population [de Haan
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1935: 395-396]. The term "peranakan" has
been since then applied exclusively to the
Java-born Chinese.
Whatever the origin of the separation policy
was, it became later a very useful tool for
political control based on divide et impera. It
was extended to cover the style of dress each
group could wear. The Chinese were, for in-
stance, forbidden on the penalty of a fine or
even imprisonment to dress like Europeans or
indigenous people. If the Chinese were allowed
to dress like the indigenous people, the
Dutch feared, they might mingle with them
and cause trouble; or Chinese debtors who
were sought by Dutch authorities could disap-
pear among the indigenous people. The
separation policy strengthened the attitude of
indifference between the groups. And it was
easier for the Dutch to identify the Chinese
with the dresses, residential quarters, and
other distinguishable marks imposed on them.
The Batavia model of a plural society and
especially of Chinese-Dutch relations was
duplicated all over Java when the VOC ex-
panded its commercial and military power.
Every important colonial town had a Chinese
quarter. The Chinese brought porcelain, cot-
ton, silk, and paper from China and sent back
spices. During the 17th century, the VOC set
up fortresses and warehouses along Java's
north coast (pasisir) such as Semarang,
Japara, and Pekalongan. In 1672, the
Chinese community in Semarang was regarded
as already numerous and important enough
to have its own Chinese captain or kapitan
[Liem Thian Joe 1933: 9-10]. In 1678,
Semarang and its environs were ceded to the
VOC by the sultan of Mataram. From then
on, Semarang became the Dutch headquarters
for its expansion to other areas of Java and for
its relations with the princes of Mataram in
the interior of Central Java. In 1740, the
massacre in Batavia caused the Chinese in
Semarang (and also other parts of Java) to rise
against the Dutch, but in 1742, peace returned
to Semarang [Willmott 1960: 4]. Mter the
treaty of Gianti in 1755, the sultanate of
Mataram was divided first into three and later
into four principalities. With the power of
Mataram crushed, the Dutch emerged as the
most powerful force in Java and kept it in
peace until 1825. During this time, the Dutch
instituted a system of government, which
J .S. Furnivall called indirect rule [Furnivall
1948], by appointing a Javanese "regent" to
rule over the population in very much the
same way as the major, kapitan and lieutenant
did over the Chinese.
When peace was restored after 1740,
Semarang became prosperous. The Chinese
naturally shared this prosperity with the
Dutch, and became more indispensable to
them. The Chinese brought the products of
the interior to coastal cities for shipment out-
side, and took imported goods from Europe to
the peasants in the interior. The important
rice trade was also in their hands. Then there
were lucrative incomes from government tax
farms and monopolies. With peace in the in-
terior, the Chinese began also to farm such
taxes in the principalities as the toll-gate tax,
bazaar tax, and land tax. The Javanese
princes and nobility rented out their lands (ap-
panages) to Europeans and Chinese. As
Semarang became prosperous, the post of its
governor became the most coveted one within
the VOC, yielding sometimes more income than
that of the Governor General in its twilight
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days when corruption became rampant.
The Chinese traveler to Java, Ong Tae Hae,
who visited Semarang in 1783, described it as
a finer town than Batavia, which was suffering
from malaria at that time [Ong 1849]. Ac-
cording to him, Semarang had a bigger ter-
ritory under its trading network, and its pro-
duction was more diverse and greater in
volume. And since it attracted a large
number of trading vessels, its business com-
munity was more active than anywhere else.
Indeed, Semarang was more favored by
nature than Batavia. It had hills right behind
it to which its people could retreat for a cool
climate, while Batavia was surrounded by
malaria-infested morasses. So, Semarang
became the main harbor of the pasisir and
kept this position until the 1890s when it was
taken over by Surabaya [Frederick 1978:
10-16].
The Semarang port was not deep enough
for the steamships which became the major
means of ocean transport after the opening of
the Suez Canal. However, Semarang remained
as a major business center in Java, as seen
from the fact that it was the site of the Colo-
nial Exposition in 1914. In 1864, one of the
first rail connections in Java was built be-
tween Semarang and Surakarta to provide a
better transportation system to link the
former to the interior [Wright 1909: 489].
However, from 1825 to 1830, peace in Central
Java was once again shattered by the rebellion
of Prince Diponegoro, called Java War.
After the suppression of the rebellion, the
Netherlands East Indies government (which
replaced the VOC in 1796) annexed the re-
maining part of Java and closely supervised
the governments of the princes whose ter-
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ritories came to be confined to the environs of
their kraton towns after 1830.
With the advent of the Netherlands East In-
dies, the three groups of the population
became more clearly defined. The Euro-
peans now included the Eurasians whereas
the Chinese, Arabs, and other Asians became
the foreign Orientals. In the basic law of 1854,
Europeans, foreign Orientals, and indigenes
became legal terms, and they were subjected
to different sets of laws and judged in different
courts [Purcell 1980: 436]. On the matter of
commerce, however, the Chinese came under
the Dutch commercial law, as long as it was
applicable, since the early VOC days. The
law of 1854 now covered the kongsi, the form
of business enterprise most favored by the
Chinese. In appearance, the kongsi resembled
the Dutch naamloze vennootschap, or
limited liability company [Vleming 1926:
56]. However, since the kongsi was formed on
the basis of business tradition among the Java
Chinese, its structure and function were quite
different. In the beginning, it was Dutch com-
mercial interests which insisted that the
Chinese be brought under the Dutch commer-
ciallaw so that the Dutch could have some con-
trol over Chinese debtors and other business
relations involving the two. In the long run,
however, this proved to be very beneficial for
the development of Chinese capitalism
[Purcell 1980: 436].
The Dutch civil law applied fully to Chinese
business matters, but not to Chinese family
affairs. For example, Chinese marriage, the
problem of concubines, lineage, inheritance,
bequest, and child adoption were covered by
their adat (customary) law. However, since
nobody had a very clear idea of what was their
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adat law, it was of no use when a dispute arose
between family members, especially concern-
ing large inheritance. It usually resulted in a
long and expensive litigation [Fromberg 1926],
and so by the early 20th century, the Dutch
civil law had become applicable to Chinese
family affairs as well [Purcell 1980: 438].
This limited the testamentary power of the
Chinese paterfamilias, but the Chinese did not
protest against it. They could have done so if
they really had wanted to, for people were
often protesting loudly at this time if they had
grievances. The Chinese voluntarily took
their disputes with the Dutch or with other
Chinese (often other family members) to
Dutch lawyers, some of whom became rich
with Chinese customers (for example, D.
Fock, who later became the Minister of Col-
onies, 1905-08, and Governor General of the
Netherlands East Indies, 1921-26) [Purcell
1980: 444].
In the late 19th century and the 20th cen-
tury, Chinese grievances against the colonial
government centered around the restrictions
on traveling and residence and the treatment
under the penal code for the indigenes. The
latter subjected the Chinese to the abuses of
the notorious politie-rol or police court ad-
ministered by the local Dutch authorities. In
1914 the politie-rol was abolished in Java
[Purcell 1980: 437].
The law of 1910 on Dutch onderdaanschap
(subjectship) was based on jus soli, so it made
the locally born Chinese Dutch subjects.
However, the locally born Chinese and the
Dutch were not treated equally under the
Netherlands East Indies law. On the other
hand, the Japanese and the Thai were treated
in the same way as the Dutch [Purcell 1980:
436]. The Chinese complained about this in-
equality, but the Dutch justified it by saying
that China had not reached the same level of
Westernization as Japan and Thailand had.
But the real reason for the unequal status of
the Chinese was the necessity on the part of
the Dutch to maintain the economic and social
order of the colony [Williams 1960: 28].
The restriction on the freedom of move-
ment of the Chinese was needed for the same
reason. Colonial policies in the 19th century
evolved around the cultivation system (1830-
70) and the plantation economy it created.
The colonial state developed, owned, and
managed the plantations of export crops, such
as sugar, coffee, tea, indigo, and tobacco.
The cultivation system forced the peasants to
become corvee workers at the plantations of ex-
port crops in lieu of the taxes they owed to the
colonial government, and created a system
which used "less money but [brought about]
greater profits" [de Graaf 1949: 407]. The
Netherlands Trading Society had a -monopoly
on the export of those products and took them
to the world market. The system evoked the
admiration of such writers on colonial affairs
as J.W.B. Money [Money 1985]. However,
more liberal Dutch and non-Dutch writers
were not so favorably inclined.
In order to protect the monopoly over ex-
port products and later over peasant labor, the
Dutch enforced strictly the restriction on
Chinese residence and travel from 1830 to the
early 1900s. The Chinese brought the money
economy to the interior of Java as traders and
money-lenders. The view of the Dutch offi-
cialdom at that time was that greater
monetization would make the Javanese
peasants vulnerable to sharp Chinese traders
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and usurers and lead only to their destitution,
and that this would make them demand
unreasonable wages or run away to cities and
impair the plantation economy. The view
was in sharp contrast to the modem
capitalistic view that monetization would in-
duce people to work harder by increasing
their material needs. As V. Purcell states
[Purcell 1980: 443], the Dutch officials in the
19th century were jealous of the strong
economic position of the Chinese and were
worried that this would endanger the planta-
tion economy, but they did not openly admit
it. Instead, they attributed the strong
Chinese position to the improvidence and
vices of the indigenes and argued that they
should be saved from the clutches of the
Chinese usurers and given guidance. As to
the strength of Chinese vis-a-vis Dutch
traders, the Dutch officials attributed it to
their lower standard of living and overhead
costs.
The negative attitude of Dutch officials caused
a great deal of harassment to the Chinese
living in the interior. They were allowed to
live only in towns where there was a specially
designated Chinese quarter. When the
restriction was rigorously enforced in 1830,
many Chinese in the interior were forced to
move to such towns and abandon their
businesses, houses, and other properties in
the places where they had been living. Some
Chinese preferred to opt for assimilation to
the local population than to abandon their
property and move to new towns [Rush
1977: 117]. Dutch colonial reports show that
during the whole duration of the cultivation
system, the policy of forcibly moving Chinese
to towns was carried out quite often and done
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every time a revenue farm was taken over by
the government and Chinese were no longer
needed for this purpose in the rural area.
It was, however, the passenstelsel which
was more harmful to Chinese business. It re-
quired anyone traveling outside the Chinese
quarter to get a permit from the Chinese
officer and show it to local officials at his
destination. A great deal of discretion was
given to Dutch officials in the implementation
of the passenstelsel as well as of the wi-
jkenstelsel, and they often abused their power
for their own advantages [Williams 1960: 28;
Liem Thian Joe 1933: 87-88].
Although Dutch officials considered the
Chinese as an evil for Javanese villagers, they
were fully aware that the Chinese were
necessary to maintain the colonial revenue
structure and enhance Dutch commercial in-
terests. The Chinese took the goods im-
ported from the Netherlands and other Euro-
pean countries to the interior and brought
back the products of the interior to colonial
towns and harbors. Furthermore, an impor-
tant part of the colonial revenue depended on
farming out tax: collection and monopolies to
wealthy Chinese.
The revenue farmer and his employees and
agents were free from the restrictions under
the wijkenstelsel and passenstelsel within the
territory of the farm since they were con-
sidered to go there on government business.
In a large farm many Chinese were employed
and were able to move relatively freely in its
territory.
In the early 1800s, the list of revenue and
tax: farms was very 10ng.I ) For example, there
1) "Belastingen" in Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch-
Indie, Leiden, M. Nijhoff and E.]. Brill, 1917-39.
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were farms on salt and opium trading,
pawnshop operation, wayang performance,
gambling, river crossing, cattle slaughtering,
business in a bazaar, and the placing of bird
nests on Java's south coast. But many of
these farms were gradually abolished or
replaced by the government's direct involve-
ment. Every time an important farm was
taken over by the government, it caused a
great stir in the Chinese community, as did
the abolition of the bazaar tax in 1851 [Liem
Thian Joe 1933: 82-84]. After 1880, the
opium and pawnshop farms were the only two
important farms left, but even these were
abolished in 1904 [Rush 1977: 261].
These economic and revenue policies of the
colonial government were an important in-
fluence in the evolution of the economic and
social structure of peranakan society. One
can argue that the restrictions on traveling
and residence (especially the latter), the
Chinese officer system, and the revenue farm
stimulated capital accumulation within
peranakan society and enhanced the role of
the Chinese in the colonial economy. Chinese
immigrants coming to Java were generally
poor, and needed capital and/or sponsors for
starting a business. And when they wanted
to get goods on credit from European com-
panies, they needed guarantors. For these,
they often depended on the more affluent, bet-
ter established peranakan society.
The peranakan community consisted of the
locally born Chinese who were thought to live
permanently in Java. In the 19th century,
they were predominantly of mixed blood since
it was not until later in that century that
Chinese women immigrated to Java. They
did not speak Chinese, having lost their
mother tongues in the third generation or
thereafter, if not in the second generation.
They adopted many local customs as the
result of the influence of their mothers, but
were not quite assimilated into the indigenous
society. Old peranakan families could trace
neither their ancestry in China nor the places
of their origin; they, instead, simply traced
their family origin back to the first im-
migrants who came to Java in the late 18th
century.
In Java, the peranakan community
dominated the singkeh community. Not only
did the singkeh come as poor men, but after
they made some money, they also sent a large
part of it to China to support their families or
buy the properties they would need to sustain
their life after they returned to China. But
there was no such capital drain in peranakan
society, and it was the development of this
society which brought about the strong
economic position of the Chinese in the colo-
nial economy of the 19th century.
The elites of the peranakan community
were the officers, or cabang atas, as the
Chinese chronicler of Semarang, Liem Thian
Joe, called them [Liem Thian Joe 1933: 140;
Rush 1977: 90]. Wealth was the basis for ap-
pointment to the positions of major (this posi-
tion existed only in Batavia, Semarang and
Surabaya), kapitan, and lieutenant. Wealth
also made it possible for peranakan Chinese to
become revenue farmers, and so, as Liem
Thian Joe correctly observed for Semarang,
Chinese officers and revenue farmers were
usually the same persons. And since the late
18th century, wealth, the revenue farm, and
the position of officer tended to be hereditary,
and were restricted to a small number of
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peranakan families [Onghokham 1983: 29-
57]. In Semarang, there were the Be, Liem,
Tan, and later Oei families, and in Surabaya,
there were the Han, The, Tjoa, and Kwee
families which produced officers and revenue
farmers for generations [Onghokham 1983:
42]. For example, the Be family in Semarang
and the The family in Surabaya produced four
to five generations of officers and revenue
farmers until the early 20th century, when the
officer and revenue farm systems were abol-
ished.
Revenue farms were auctioned publicly and
with great ceremony in the big hall of the
Javanese regent's dalam (court) and were sold
district by district for one or more years
[Rush 1977: 30]. Theoretically, the revenue
farm was to be given to the highest bidder,
but the final decision was left to the local
Dutch resident. He had to have confidence in
the financial and managerial capabilities of a
potential candidate. The farm price was
usually paid in installments during the farm-
ing period, so that even if someone offered the
highest bid, he could not win if the Dutch resi-
dent judged that his offer was speculative. If
he defaulted, the government would lose
millions of guilders. A Chinese officer,
however, came into close contacts with the
Dutch local resident and was better known, so
when an auction came, he was in a better posi-
tion to win the bid. Ifhe succeeded in becom-
ing a farmer, he could send his agents to the
district. Since they were free from the
government restrictions on traveling and
residence,2) besides collecting revenues, he
2) Williams sates that through the opium farms, the
Chinese could live in 30,000 villages during the
19th century in Java. See Williams [1960: 32].
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usually built up an exclusive trading network
by using those agents and enjoyed monopoly
profits. In the 1880s, despite government
restrictions, the revenue farm enabled several
ten-thousands of Chinese to move freely in the
interior.
Through revenue farms and trade
monopolies, great wealth was accumulated in
the peranakan families which could maintain
the cabang atas status. They consolidated
their position through intermarriage and get-
ting their sons and sons-in-law appointed to
officer positions in other towns and helping
them in getting revenue farms in other
districts. Accumulated capital was mainly in-
vested within the relatively small Chinese
quarters, and this made them become the
most prosperous and commercially active
centers of Javanese towns and cities
[Onghokham 1983: 29]. The Chinese
quarters also developed a network of relations
and business ethic which were necessary for
doing business on the basis of trust-a sine
qua non for capitalistic development. At the
same time, living and working in the Chinese
quarters might have reduced living and
business expenses for the Chinese traders,
shopkeepers, and artisans and given them an
advantage in business over the Dutch, as the
latter often complained about [Purcell 1980:
432-443]. For a singkeh, to become a cabang
atas was his dream. To realize it, he made
efforts to get accepted by peranakan society,
use its capital and business network, and even-
tually get assimilated to it [Skinner 1963:
97-117]. It was not an impossible dream since
there were ups and downs in peranakan soci-
etyand only a few cabang atas families could
maintain their position over generations.
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If there were strengths in peranakan soci-
ety, there were also some weaknesses. A
great deal of wealth was dissipated on lawyers
and other court expenses because of the litiga-
tion over inheritance, which often arose after
the death of a wealthy peranakan because he
usually had a number of wives and concubines
and children from them [Willmott 1960:
51]. Even if there was no litigation, wealth
was divided by a large number of children
(usually sons), and this tended to cause capital
to be dissipated. Relations among the
children especially of different mothers, or
even of the same mother, tended to be bad,
and for them to cooperate in business was diffi-
cult. Chinese business was personally struc-
tured. The death of the founder, manager or
even a partner often ended its life.3) Business
ethic, too, was perceived in personal terms
[Willmott 1960: 69], and outside closely knit
groups, there were sharp business practices
and a great deal of suspicion about others
[Borel 1900].
While great wealth was obtained from
revenue farms and trading, the Chinese were
usually local- and district-bound. The restric-
tions on their traveling and residence made it
very difficult for their business to become
Java-wide, let alone country-wide and interna-
tional. There were, however, a few excep-
tions in the late 19th century. Some cabang
atas families of Semarang, notably the Be
family, the doyen of the cabang atas there
[Rush 1977: 100], obtained opium farms in
several districts in Central Java, and had sons
and sons-in-law appointed as officers and
revenue farmers in other towns and districts.
3) "De Indo-Chineesche Familie en Wetgeving" in
[Fromberg 1926].
Being a big rice exporter and general goods
importer, the Be family extended their
trading network to as far as Singapore.
The business interests of the Be family
were already quite extensive in the late 19th
century, but their management was largely
familistic [Willmott 1960: 51]. In some
ways, peranakan society was much more con-
servative than singkeh society; they were
more family oriented and employed mainly
family members for their businesses. As
many writers have pointed out, this familistic
characteristic prevented Chinese businesses
from expanding and kept them generally
small and weak [Vleming 1926: 75; Williams
1952]. The Chinese themselves have
recognized this problem and said that a family
business generally lasts, at most, for three
generations. However, in the business en-
vironment of the late 19th and the early 20th
centuries, there were reasons for nepotism.
Since the level of education was generally low
and questionable business practices were
prevalent outside the well-established net-
work of personal relations, the family was vir-
tually the only source of trustworthy
workers. And they, too, employed
clandestine business practices such as tax eva-
sion using several books, and had to protect
these and other trade secrets from leaking
out. Furthermore, capital was scarce, and
the most effective way of generating extra
capital was to use family labor and minimize
wage payments.
The wealthy peranakan Chinese sometimes
mingled socially with the Dutch. In away,
they were expected to entertain the Dutch to
enliven their monotonous life in a local colo-
nial town. Dutch officials and employees
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were restricted in spending because they had
to depend on fixed salaries from the govern-
ment or companies. Although the Dutch resi-
dent gave receptions on the birthdays of the
Dutch royal family and other national occa-
sions, to which the Dutch community and the
non-Dutch elites were invited, the Dutch often
depended for feasting on the Javanese regent
and the wealthy Chinese [Onghokham 1983:
29-57]. Grand feasts were given by the rich
Chinese on such occasions as the Chinese
lunar New Year, birth of a son, wedding, offi-
cial recognition, and appointment. The
guests were divided into three groups (the
Dutch, Chinese, and indigenes), and each was
provided with its own food and entertainment,
but there was some interaction among them,
though it was a little formal and superficial.
Dutch travelers in the late 19th century report
that they danced with the daughters of the
cabang atas family of Surabaya, the Thes.
There were more conspicuous forms of win-
ning favors from the Dutch. On New Year's
Day, expensive gifts (such as a fish with big
diamonds as its eyes) were sent to the resi-
dent. Or when a Dutch official was going
home or moving to another town and selling
his belongings, the Chinese offered high
prices-much higher than their real prices.
They were in effect sending signals to his suc-
cessor as to what he could expect when his
turn came [Liem Thian Joe 1933: 148].
These forms of "corruption" lasted as long as
the revenue farm lasted and was officially
tolerated. But after the revenue farm was
abolished, the Dutch officialdom became
generally clean and free from corruption [Fur-
nivall 1948].
The language used between the three
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population groups was the archipelago's
lingua franca, Malay. Unlike other colo-
nialists, the Dutch did not encourage the use
of their language by non-Dutch people and
usually thought that the use of the Dutch
language by the non-Dutch was offensive.
Even in the 20th century, when Dutch schools
were established for the non-Dutch (including
the Chinese), the Dutch could not emotionally
get away from that feeling and were saying
that they preferred the non-Dutch not to
understand their language.
Close relations with the Dutch influenced
the culture of peranakan society. By buying
Dutch furniture and other Dutch products, the
cabang atas peranakan adopted the Dutch
style of living. In the 20th century, when
Dutch naturalization became possible, many
peranakan Chinese sought it and obtained
European status [Skinner 1963]. Even in
the early 1940s, when the threat of war began
endangering Dutch colonialism, there were
still some Chinese asking for Dutch naturaliza-
tion.
In Semarang in the late 1870s, Dutch in-
fluences in the Chinese officer families became
obvious. The lieutenant Liem asked the colo-
nial government to admit his son to a Dutch
school, but when he was refused, he hired a
Dutch governess to teach Dutch to his
children. In the late 19th century, rich
peranakan Chinese began hiring more and
more Dutch teachers for their children and
sometimes for themselves [Liem Thian Joe
1933: 150]. And around the same time, mis-
sionary schools began admitting Chinese
children. As a result, there emerged a group
of peranakan Chinese who could understand
the Dutch language and culture.
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III Oei Tjie Sien
In 1858, when Dei Tjie Sien, the father of
Dei Tiong Ham, landed in Semarang, Java
had long recovered from the Java War (1825-
30). The population, estimated at a little over
six million in 1831, had doubled by that time
[Nitisastro 1970: 30]. However, the
cultivation system was still at its height,
limiting the freedom of movement and trade
of the Chinese. At this time, China was in the
midst of the Taiping Rebellion, and to escape
from its devastations, a large number of peo-
ple fled the country for Nanyang. Dei Tjie
Sien seems to have come to Java during this
emigration wave. Unlike most other im-
migrants, he seems to have had some educa-
tion. This was not unusual in China in the
1830s when he was born, for village schools
were spreading then [Gernet 1986: 473-
475]. However, he probably did not bring
much capital, since he was peddling Chinese
pots and wares in the early days of his life in
Semarang.
Semarang was the right place for an aspir-
ing trader. During Dei Tjie Sien's time, it
was the biggest harbor and trading center of
Java. In contrast, Batavia still had its
hinterland, Praiangan, closed to Chinese or
any other private traders, in order for the
Dutch to be able to protect the forced cultiva-
tion of tea. And in Semarang, fairly smooth
relations between the Dutch officials and the
Chinese were being maintained by the cabang
atas families which were the oldest and best
established in Java. Wealthy peranakan
Chinese had been building houses and
buildings in the European style, though they
did not make them too similar to colonial offi-
cial buildings, afraid that they might incur the
wrath of the Dutch officials and get their
buildings torn down and get fined [Liem
Thian Joe 1933: 150]. Although the Dutch
officials were sometimes arbitrary in exercis-
ing power and upholding colonial prestige in
front of the Chinese, the worst abuses in
restricting the movement and residence of the
Chinese were avoided in Semarang.
More important for Dei Tjie Sien's rise as a
trader was the possibility of a singkeh's accep-
tance by peranakan society, which became
difficult in the late 19th century. In the 1850s,
Chinese immigrants came in smaller groups
(sometimes individually) than those who came
later. And the Chinese officers were not yet
so "Dutchified" and separated from the
generally ill-educated and poor singkeh as in
the early 20th century. Even the cabang atas
families were only a few generations away
from their singkeh ancestors. Dei Tjie Sien's
education might have also helped him in
developing close relations with wealthy
Chinese.
He moved fairly quickly from rags to riches.
In five years after his arrival in 1863, he founded
Kian Gwan as a kongsi. His easy adapta-
tion, if not assimilation, to peranakan society
seems to have made this possible. For it was
certainly not his trading in Chinese wares and
pots which made him a big merchant; it was
rather the trading of the agricultural produce
of Central Java such as rice, gambir, and in-
cense, for which he needed the capital and
trading network of peranakan society. At
this time, however, the trading of sugar
(which later became the major commodity of
Kian Gwan) was still a government monopoly.
Dei Tjie Sien founded Kian Gwan with an
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outsider called Ang rather than with his
brothers. This was not an unusual thing to
do for a singkeh because as a new arrival he
did not have a big family. Singkeh Chinese
were usually less familistic than peranakan
Chinese for this reason [Willmott 1960:
107]. What was a little unusual is that Kian
Gwan was registered with the local govern-
ment, for even now, many kongsi are founded
only orally and not registered (such kongsi are
called kongsi mulut) [Vleming 1926: 67].
But at his time, there were some other kongsi
registered with the government. They were
patterned after what is known as a limited
liability company under the Dutch commer-
ciallaw. According to J. Vleming, since a
limited liability company was the safest form
of business organization, the Chinese
sometimes made use of it from the early 19th
century. The Dutch commercial law enabled
two persons to form a kongsi. A family com-
pany or even a company of single ownership
could be registered as a limited liability com-
pany, with the second person as a silent or
puppet partner.
Oei Tjie Sien returned to China, and on the
way there and back, he might have stopped at
several places in Southeast Asia. Otherwise,
it is difficult to explain Kian Gwan's interna-
tional outlook. In the late 19th century, when
Java needed to import a large quantity of rice,
Oei Tjie Sien developed contacts abroad and
became a rice importer.
Oei Tjie Sien's wife was definitely
peranakanized if not a peranakan herself, as
attested by her way of life, such as playing
Javanese cards and chewing beetle nut, gam-
bjr leaves, and tobacco [Koo 1943: 14-15].
In 1866 she gave birth to Oei Tiong Ham. In
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1884, when he was 18 years old, his father ar-
ranged for him a marriage with one of the
daughters of the well established Goei family
in Semarang. This shows Oei Tjie Sien's en-
try into the cabang atas class. The Goei fam-
ily were holding officer positions and revenue
farms. 4) The founder of the family probably
came to Java sometime in the 1770s, and the
family had become very peranakanized by the
time of the marriage. It was either Oei Tjie
Sien's wealth or his entry into peranakan fam-
ily which enabled him to form this marriage
alliance. The Oei family was still new and
upstart compared with the Goei family. In
peranakan society, this fact counted a great
deal, but Oei Tjie Sien was able to overcome it
somehow.
Unlike his dynamic son Oei Tiong Ham, Oei
Tjie Sien seems to have been very cautious
and conservative in business, but he became
quite wealthy with this business philosophy.
Many wealthy Chinese invested their money
in real estate. The revenue farmers and
sugar and rice mill owners thought their
business was basically speculative and full of
risk, and invested money in real estate since
in this way, they could obtain fixed and safe
property incomes. Another reason for prefer-
ring real estate investment was that proper-
ties were easier to manage than business, and
4) Dei Hui Lan (or Koo Hui-lan) says that her
mother's family was newly arrived and poor
[Koo 1943: 9-10]. In this case, however, her
memory seems to have failed her due to her long
stay abroad. Tjo~ Soe Tjong says the first wife of
Dei Tiong Ham was a daughter of the well-known
and wealthy Goei family of Semarang [Tjoa
1963: 607]. According to Wright, the Goei family
of Semarang came to Java in the late 1770s and
was one of the oldest and wealthiest peranakan
families of Semarang [Wright 1909: 511-512].
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were easier to divide among children. But
real estate investment got sometimes heated
up, endangering the financial condition of
their main business. In general, it was a
heavy drain on capital and a constraining fac-
tor for business expansion.
Like a typical merchant at that time, Dei
Tjie Sien also invested heavily in real estate
after becoming successful in business. In
1883, he bought several properties of an
opium farmer called Hoo, who had gone
bankrupt, but he was not yet rich enough to
buy his opium farm [Liem Thian Joe 1933:
151]. Mter this, he seems to have gradually
retired from business, and started developing
his garden and devoting himself to some
literary activities. Before his death, he deter-
mined the successor to his business, and divided
his properties among his children. It was
not unusual for a successful merchant to do so
at that time because dreadful litigation often
arose among children after his death. Dei
Tjie Sien chose Oei Tiong Ham as his
business successor, though he seems to have
left a large part of his wealth to his other
children. Dei Tjie Sien was a hard worker,
but he also enjoyed the good sides of life; he
became addicted to Dutch biscuits and
cognac, as described by his granddaughter
Dei Hui Lan [Koo 1943: 16-17].
IV Dei Tiong Ham and His Time
Dei Tiong Ham seems to have worked from
his early years under his father's tutelage. In
his youth, according to his daughter Hui Lan,
he was a sort of wastrel and gambler, and
even lost a great sum of money [Koo 1943:
9-11]. At that time, this was not unusual for
the son of a rich father, but its authenticity is
somewhat questionable. It sounds too much
like the story of a Javanese hero (or a Moslem
saint) who in his youth stole, gambled or did
some mischief. Javanese servants might
have thought that being a big man, Dei Tiong
Ham must have done something wrong in his
youth, as a Javanese hero usually did, and told
this to Hui Lan and his other children as if it
was a genuine story.
Dei Tiong Ham's rise in the business world
was fast, and surpassed his father's
achievements before his death in 1900. With
his appointment as lieutenant in 1886, he
entered formally the cabang atas class in
Semarang, and ten years later, he was made
major [Rush 1977: 267]. In many ways, he
was a different man from the father. The
father was a cautious and conservative man,
but Oei Tiong Ham was innovative and dar-
ing. For example, the father had a strong
adherence to Chinese clothing and hair styles
[Coppel 1989: 183], but in 1889, Oei Tiong
HaPl petitioned the Dutch government
through his lawyer for permission to cut his
queue and dress in a Western style [Godley
1981: 19; Liem Thian Joe 1933: 154]. This
petition was granted, and he became the first
Java Chinese to dress in a Western style. In
1904, this example was followed by all the
Kian Gwan personnel [Liem Thian Joe 1933:
183].
Oei Tiong Ham was also different from his
contemporaries in Java. For one thing, at one
stage of his life he became an Anglophile,
though he was living in the Dutch colony [de
Veer 1908]. Of course, when the revenue
farm system was still operating, he maintained
friendly relations with the Dutch officials.
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Even after he became a big businessman,
although Semarang was not a "kota amb-
tenaar" (town of officials), as the historian
Liem Thian Joe explains [Liem Thian Joe
1933: 135], Oei Tiong Ham took all the care
not to offend Dutch officials [Koo 1943: 52].
For example, when he was riding a horse car-
riage, he made sure that he did not overtake
the carriage of a Dutch official. In the early
1900s, however, he put the British flag on his
motorboat and flaunted it before Dutch offi-
cials [de Veer 1908]. It was this Anglophile
attitude which broadened his vision and enabled
him to venture successfully into the world
sugar market. In 1910, he set up an office in
London to sell his sugar. Earlier, Java sugar
was exported to the Netherlands, but with the
increase in beet sugar production, the Euro-
pean market began to be closed, and in its
place, London became the major export
market for Java sugar.5)
It was in the 1880s that Oei Tiong Ham
started trading in sugar, which later became
his major business activity. In general, the
1880s was not a good decade for the sugar in-
dustry; in the early part of the decade, it was
hit by a depression. But Oei Tiong Ham suc-
ceeded when others failed. He made large
profits by cornering the sugar market in
Java. In 1890, with this success in sugar, he
had enough money to buy opium farms in
Semarang, Yogyakarta, Surakarta, and
Surabaya. In the late 1880s, there was a
crisis in the opium farm, and only four out of
19 opium farms could survive. This gave Oei
Tiong Ham an opportunity to buy the opium
farms which had been jealously guarded by a
5) "Suiker" in Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch-Indie.
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small number of closely knit cabang atas
families. These farms had been lucrative and
given them patronage as well as prestige in
Chinese society [Rush 1977: 215]. Oei
Tiong Ham kept the opium farms until 1904,
when they were taken over by the opium regie
(regime) administered by the colonial govern-
ment. During this period of a little over a
decade, he reputedly made about 18 million
guilders as net profits.
In the 1890s, Oei Tiong Ham went also into
sugar production. In this decade, he acquired
five sugar factories and modernized them by
installing new machines [Tjoa 1963: 605].
He then expanded into the trading in kapok,
rubber, tapioca and tea [Godley 1981: 18].
In managing his businesses, he relied exten-
sively on non-family members. He hired not
only promising Chinese but also Dutch
managers and technical experts. He
understood well what money could do. He used
it to hire competent people and evoke their
loyalty. In the management of his opium
farms, too, he seems to have relied on the out-
siders he could trust, instead of his relatives,
as typically done in the opium farms of cabang
atas families at that time.
According to Liem Tjwan Ling, Oei Tiong
Ham always sought to meet famous and suc-
cessful people such as the young Chinese
widow, Tio Tjien Tiong, who had controlled
the best sugar fields in the Malang area [Liem
Tjwan Ling 1979: 156]. He must have done
the same thing on his trips abroad. He
visited various trading centers in Southeast
Asia. In Singapore, he became the friend of
the famous Tjong brothers (or Chang in Man-
darin), Tjong A Fie and Tjong Yong Hian
[Godley 1981: 20], who were Chinese
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kapitan in Medan, East Sumatra, where
Chinese immigration started later than in Java
and where ties with Singapore and British
Malaya were closer. Oei Tiong Ham realized
in due course that Singapore was the most im-
portant trading center in the region and that
the Chinese there were treated much better
than in the Netherlands East Indies. So, he
soon established an office in Singapore and
made it a major link to the outside world for
his expanding trading network in the Dutch
colony. Thus he joined the small league of
successful overseas Chinese who, as M.R.
Godley describes it, behaved as if there were
no national boundaries [Godley 1981: 20].
His success in sugar trading in the 1910s,
during which sugar prices fluctuated wildly
due to the First World War, earned him the
name of "Java's sugar lord" in British
circles. The postwar decline in commodity
prices, sugar price in particular, did not seem
to have harmed Oei Tiong Ham very much.
What seems to have pained him most was the
so-called war profit tax, or a tax on excess
profits earned during the war. Since it was in
addition to the income tax he paid, he felt it
discriminatory. In 1917, the Netherlands
adopted a 30 percent tax on excess profits
earned during the war, with 1914 as the base
year.6) Although the colonial government in
the Indies adopted the same measure, since
its bureaucracy was much slower in its im-
plementation, the tax was not imposed until
1919, and in some cases, it was collected as
late as 1924 [Tjoa 1963: 651]. Oei Tiong
Ham moved to Singapore in 1921 partly
because of this tax. At the same time, he
6) "Belastingen" in Encyc/ojxl£die van Nederlandsch-Indie.
wanted to free himself from the Dutch civil
law which restricted his freedom to select the
children who would inherit his business.
When he went to Singapore, he did not report
to the Dutch consulate; according to the
Dutch law of 1910, a Dutch subject who failed
to report to the Dutch legation within three
months of his arrival in a foreign country
would lose his Dutch subject status [Purcell
1980: 442-443]. Because he was no longer a
Dutch subject after three months in
Singapore, he could now determine his suc-
cessors as he wished. He died in Singapore
in 1924.
The expansion of Oei Tiong Ham's business
coincided with the rise of Chinese na-
tionalism. In Java, there arose at the turn of
the 19th and 20th centuries a movement
against the Chinese officer system and the colo-
nial government's discriminatory treatment
of the Chinese [Williams 1960: 63]. It
seems Oei Tiong Ham did not care much
about the officer system, for in 1896 he re-
quested the colonial government to relieve
him of the position of lieutenant citing various
pressing business matters as the reason
[Rush 1977: 268]. The Dutch granted his re-
quest, but kept him as honorary major, which
title he kept during his lifetime. From the
1890s, the officer system began to fall into
disuse, and the officer titles became merely
honorary. Dutch attempts to prop up the
system by giving Chinese officers Dutch
uniforms with a lot of gold braid made them
look silly, and antipathy towards them
became stronger [Williams 1960: 128].
According to J. Rush, the opium farm crisis
in the 1880s which destroyed so many old
officer families brought great discredit to the
171
officer institution [Rush 1977: 231]. As a
result of this crisis, an anti-opium movement,
which some Chinese intellectuals also joined,
could gather some strength in Java [Indie en
het Opium 1931]. Quite a number of novels
were written in Malay by peranakan Chinese
about the sinister and evil powers of the
officer-cum-revenue farmer. One common
theme was that the officer frames an honest
Chinese for a vicious cause by using his
monopoly right over opium (for example, by
planting opium in the victim's house and let-
ting it be discovered by the police) [Rush
1977: 239-242; Salmon 1981].
The social tension in the Chinese commu-
nity was partly caused by demographic
developments within the Chinese quarters.
There was a natural growth of population, and
added to it were the new waves of Chinese im-
migrants since 1870 which accelerated in the
early 20th century. Under this demographic
setting, the end of the two remaining major
farms, the opium and pawnshop farms, made
the Chinese feel sharper than ever the restric-
tion on movement. They lost not only an im-
portant source of livelihood but also the
justification for going into the interior. Mean-
while, since capital could not be invested in
revenue farms any longer, a large amount of
Chinese capital became available for invest-
ment in other areas, but there were few attrac-
tive areas for investment because of the
restriction on traveling and residence. As a
result, the Chinese quarters suddenly became
too cramped [Rush 1977: 268].
At the same time, the relations between
officers and singkeh worsened. After 1890,
since Chinese officers were allowed to live out-
side the Chinese quarters, many of them moved
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out. So, for the singkeh, they were not
around in the neighborhood when they were
needed. And the singkeh felt they were not
well understood in their dealings with govern-
ment authorities since the officers did not
understand Chinese-the main language for
the singkeh. On the other hand, the
peranakan, especially the wealthy Chinese
officers, began looking down upon the singkeh
since they were poor and uneducated, and
prejudice grew against them. The tension
sometimes resulted in physical clashes be-
tween singkeh and officers, or non-officer
peranakan, especially around 1910 when the
revolution broke out in China [Williams
1960: 124].
Meanwhile, in the Netherlands, a new wave
of moral conscience arose concerning the
welfare of the Javanese masses. In 1900, the
Dutch Queen spoke of "debt of honor" to the
Javanese masses in her· speech from the
throne, and this inaugurated the so called
ethical policy. This newly discovered moral
duty to elevate the Javanese from poverty, ig-
norance, and over-crowdedness was the result
of the electoral victory of the Dutch Christian
political parties, though it had perhaps existed
consciously or unconsciously in the minds of
many colonial officials [Williams 1960: 38].
However, it was only after the Queen's speech
that moral conscience became loudly proclaimed.
The colonial government created commis-
sions to study the declining welfare of the
Javanese, unfair distribution of tax burdens,
and many other socio-economic problems fac-
ing Javanese society. In fact, the colonial offi-
cials of the "ethical school" thought that the
Chinese were glaringly prosperous in com-
parison with the Javanese, overlooking the ex-
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istence of a large number of poor Chinese,
especially among the newly arrived. More
than ever, the "ethical" officials came to feel
that the Javanese had to be rescued and pro-
tected from the tentacles of the Chinese.
Ending the revenue farms, especially the
opium and pawnshop farms, was part of the
"ethical policy." The Dutch also founded the
rural credit bank, competing with the Chinese
in money-lending to the Javanese peasants.
The Minister of Colonies, who became rich in
Batavia as a lawyer for the Chinese, wrote to
the officials in the Indies to restrict Chinese
movements into the interior, for "they are a
pernicious influence" [Purcell 1980: 444].
Moral conscience spread among a great
number of colonial officials, and this awaken-
ing seems to have caused a number of ill
treatments of the Chinese by Dutch officials.
And prejudice against the Chinese increased
more sharply than ever in the 1900s.
It was in this situation that there arose a
movement among the Chinese in Java, or the
Young Chinese Movement, as was called by
P .H. Fromberg, the Dutch colonial advisor for
Chinese affairs and main advocate of Chinese
cause.7) It was a movement against the colo-
nial government policy on the Chinese. The
Chinese demanded the colonial government to
end the restrictions on traveling and residence
and give them legal status equal to the Euro-
peans. The movement also led to the found-
ing of the Tiong Hwa Hwee Kwan School
(T.H.H.K. School), Chinese Chamber of Com-
merce, and a more politically oriented reading
club, SoePo Sia. It was partly in response to
this movement that the Dutch established the
7) "De Chineesche Beweging op Java" in
[Fromberg 1926].
Hollands Chineesche Scholen (School); it
became necessary to keep the loyalty of their
Chinese subjects. Also as a response to the
movement (and the pressure of Dutch
businesses which felt that the restrictions on
Chinese traveling and residence were
detrimental to their business interests), the
Dutch practically abolished the restrictions on
traveling and residence in 1910, although it
took another several years for these to be com-
pletely abolished (this was done in 1916).
If Oei Tiong Ham was a daring "gambler"
in business, he seemed to be very cautious in
politics. There is no record showing that he
made a major financial contribution to the
Young Chinese Movement. He did not seem
to have been a founder of the T .H.H.K.
School in Semarang or even a member of its
board. He kept even greater distance from
the more politically oriented Soe Po Sia.
However, from the very beginning, Oei Tiong
Ham helped the founding of the Chinese
Chamber of Commerce in Semarang, and
played a key role in it for some years. Kian
Gwan directors in various cities and towns in
the Indies also played an important role in
their respective local Chambers. There was
no politics involved, however, in Dei Tiong
Ham's and Kian Gwan's involvement in the
Chinese Chambers. For example, in 1912
when some groups tried to use the Chambers
to boycott Japanese goods, the Kian Gwan fac-
tion blocked the move. But a few years later,
the Kian Gwan faction organized a boycott
against its Dutch business rivals [Williams
1960: 105].
Dei Tiong Ham seemed little interested in
the question of China and other political mat-
ters. Certainly, he headed welcoming com-
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mittees and acted as host to Chinese imperial
and republican envoys, but he did the same
thing for the crown princes of Denmark and
Greece. Many factions in China must have
contacted him for help since he was probably
the richest man in Nanyang and certainly the
most influential Chinese in the Netherlands
East Indies. However, despite his knowledge
of the revolutionary movement in China, he
kept a neutral stand and did not support it
financially [Godley 1981: 184]. One close
associate of Sun Yat Sen once complained
that the Chinese capitalists in Nanyang were
against the revolution and afraid of it. But
for Oei Tiong Ham, the question was not
possibly whether he was for or against the
revolution, or whether he was afraid of it or
not. It seems that he wanted to be as
apolitical as possible. Except the honorary ti-
tle of major of the Chinese in Semarang, he
did not seek any official position. He did not
receive any decoration or mandarin title dur-
ing the last days of the Ch'ing dynasty, though
he was obviously among the first persons con-
tacted in its courtship of the Nanyang Chinese
[Godley 1981]. In contrast, a number of
lesser Chinese in Java received decorations
and mandarin titles from the imperial dynasty.
V Concluding Remarks
Indonesian capitalism has always been
politically connected. Writing on Dutch Java
before 1800, the Dutch historian L. Blusse
observed: "Only those individuals who coupled
their fate with that of the Company [VOC] or
who plundered it from within were able to
build considerable fortunes, a state of affairs
as valid for the Dutch as for other inhabitants
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of the town [Batavia], the Chinese included"
[Blusse 1986: 5-6]. This state of affairs has
existed in any polity in Indonesian history,
whether it was colonial, traditional or na-
tional.
The Dutch realized that they had no com-
mon interests with the Chinese, but only "like
interests" [van den Muijzenberg 1965]. So, the
Dutch sometimes saw the Chinese as rivals, as
many traditional ruling groups did when they
tried to dominate the economy with political
power. In fact, nowhere were the Chinese
regarded with greater suspicion than in the
Netherlands East Indies. In contrast, in the
British and French colonies, there was
relatively little suspicion of the Chinese mer-
chants. Even in the postwar period, this
suspicion did not decline; at times, it got
worse under nationalist Indonesia. In tradi-
tional Javanese peasant society, the Chinese
merchants still do not have much legitimacy.
It was under the condition of suspicion that
Chinese capitalism was born and grew.
Naturally this molded its character. Not-
withstanding the obvious importance of the
Chinese economic role, recent scholars on In-
donesia have been rather pessimistic about
their leadership role in economic develop-
ment [Williams 1952; Willmott 1960: 51].
Chinese capitalists have been short-term
oriented; they only serve as a link in the
economic chain. They are highly con-
spicuous in consumption, and speculative in in-
vestment, only interested in making a fast
back. And one should add that Chinese
capitalists do not venture imaginatively and in-
novatively outside the government ~phere
where they could get lucrative contracts.
Hence, their entrepreneurship has always
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been a step behind national development
needs.
The Dei Tiong Ham story is an outstanding
exception to Indonesian entrepreneurial
history. His business career was relatively
free from government patronage. He did not
get much involved in government or military
contracts as the other wealthy merchants of
his time invariably did. Unlike his contem-
poraries in Southeast Asia, Oei Tiong Ham
was innovative in finding new opportunities
for investment and rationalizing his business
organization. It should be pointed out at the
same time, however, that the 1910s, when his
business rapidly expanded, was a decade
when the Chinese enjoyed the unrestricted
freedom of movement, which was un-
precedented in Indonesian history. With no
need for government patronage and a rela-
tively corruption-free bureaucracy, Oei Tiong
Ham could concentrate all his energy on
business expansion and rationalization.
The end of Oei Tiong Ham Concern came in
the post-independence period, during the time
of Sukarno. In 1961, the Sukarno govern-
ment took over the company, charging that it
had committed certain economic crimes. It is
true that government suspicion against
business is not a new but recurrent problem in
Indonesian history; it existed during the colo-
nial period as explained above, and it also did
under indigenous rulers. But it reached a
climax around 1960 under Sukarno. The Oei
Tiong Ham business empire grew at a time
when the Chinese did not need a strong iden-
tification with a state, but this attitude became
fatal when Indonesia became a nation state
and the government brought the economy
firmly under its control.
It goes without saying that without trust be-
tween society and business, neither the govern-
ment nor the economy could modernize and
take the lead in national development. In this
regard, the recent economic success of
Thailand is worth considering. One major
reason for Thai success is the relatively
healthy relationship between society and
business. Basically, the Thai government
has confidence in business, and there is little
social prejudice against it. Indonesia and
Thailand have many common features (social
structure, climate, etc.), and even in their
history, there are many parallels. Perhaps in
the future, Indonesia should look at the Thai
model in order to create a healthy environ-
ment for business and make it the propelling
force of economic development.
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